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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J.

WENDELL MARRIOT,
Administrator of the Estate of
Russell L. Marriott, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

SKYLINE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a corporation; OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL UNION NO. 3 of the
INTL UNION OF OPERATING ENG.,
a corporation; and OPERATING ENG.
TRUST FUND FOR UTAH, a corporation,
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO., an Insurance Company; and PACIFIC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CO., an Insurance Company,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11879

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is a suit for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.0Q)
in life insurance coverage and Two Thousand Dollars
($2,000.00) accidental death benefit against the Defendants excepting Skyline Construction Company which was
found to have no liability.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, ruled in favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary
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Judgment and against Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. Pbintiff
then filed a Motion to Rehear and also to enter Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for Judgment to he
entered in favor of the Plaintiff. Said Motion wa<; heord
by the Court on September 15, 1969, and denied.
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff requests reversal of the Judgment of
the loweri Court and for finding in favor of the Plaintiff
and granting of Judgment thereon, or in the alternative
to remand to the District Court for trial on the issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Upon ordering of the record in this case it was found
that the argument of the counsel at the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion for rehearing were not reported and that the stipulations of counsel contained therein were subsequently not made any
part of the written record. However, most of the pertinent facts were not in dispute and the Motion for Summary Judgment of P. Knute Peterson, Attorney for the
Defendants, Operating Engineers, Operating Engineers
Trust Fund for Utah, Continental Casualty Company,
and Pacific National Life Assurance Company dated
April 7, 1969, is substantially in agreement with the following facts.
Mr. Russell L. Marriot died on September 16, 1964,
as a result of an accident which occurred in the course
of his employment with Skyline Construction Company,
Inc., and the Defendants do not deny that he was entitled
to the privileges of a member of the Operating Engineers ,
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Union and had worked sufficient hours to qualify under
a Group Insurance Plan of the Operating Engineers Trust
Fun<l for Utah.
The basic features of this insurance program, so far
as introduced in evidence to date, consist of a booklet
with the cover printed in green and the title "Operating
Engineers Trust Fund for Utah-Group Insurance Program, III Volume reprint January, 1964, Ql-71742-A43." This program provided for $2,000.00 life insurance
coverage and $2,000.00 accidental death benefit and Defendants have refused to honor the claim for the same
alleging that the insurance had not yet become effective,
that is that the effective date of coverage had not passed
prior to the death of Russell L. Marriot.
It is the contention of the Defendants that Mr. Marriot had worked 300 hours at the end of September and
that consequently his insurance would have become effective on November 1, 1964, and that since he died before
that time, he was not entitled to insurance coverage despite the fact that all of the requirements had otherwise
been met.

ARGUMENTS
I. THAT THE INSURANCE COVERAGE AS SET
FORTH IN THE BOOKLET FOR JANUARY, 1964,
Ql-71742-A43 CONTAINED A WAIVER OF THE
REQUIREMENTS AND THAT THE DECEASED,
RUSSELL L. MARRIOT, MET THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR COVERAGE, EXCEPT SUCH REQUIREMENTS
AS WERE WAIVED IN SAID GROUP INSURANCE
PROGRAM.
Page 6 of the Insurance Booklet contains the follow-

3

ing waiver, speaking of the effective date of the insurance.
"If you are not in active regular employment on account
of injury or sickness on the date your insurance '' oulcl
have become effective as indicated above, your insurance
will become effective on the date you return to full time
work or availability for work; except that if you become
disabled while actively at work between the date on which
you complete the necessary hours per eligibility L!'cn the
date your eligibility actually begins, your insurance will
take effect as indicated above.'"
This same booklet then continues, on the same page
6, with four instances when the insurance terminates and
admittedly none of them cover the situations now before
the Court.

If the insurance company had intended that the
beneficiary should not be entitled to any benefits if he

died while on the job, and after completing the requirements concerning working hours and membership, the
insurance companies could have adequately and clearly
made provision by listing a fifth reason for the insurance
terminating, and as will be pointed out more fully later,
the deceased had performed every act that was necessary
to qualify and had given full consideration for coverage,
also that if there is any doubt or ambiguity it should be
resolved in favor of the insured.

II. IF THE WAIVER OF TI-IE REQUIREMENT
AS SET FORTH IN TI rn PRECEDING ARGUMENT
DOES NOT CREATE A CLEAR W AIYER, THEN AT
LEAST THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY AND THIS AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLANT.
1

Italics supplied.
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The ambiguity, if any, is created by the contention
of the Defendants that death is not a disability and of
cot·
it is widely held that in policies providing for
health and disability coverage, the coverage does not apply if the person actually dies, but this is a totally different context than the one now before the Court which
seeks to deny to the Defendant benefits which have been
earned and paid for by the labor of the deceased, Russell
L. Marriot. Going again to th qualification contained on
page 6 of the insurance booklet, there is a waiver for injury, sickness, or disability and the question is whether
the insurance can take effect when the insured person
has in fact died. This, we submit, creates the only ambiguity herein and if such is an ambiguity the law concerning the resolution of it is quite extensive.
Starting with Insurance Law and Practice by Appleman, we find the statements and citations which follow.
"If the insurance contract is ambiguous as to
the date which should control, a construction
favorable to the insured is taken." 2
"It has been almost the unanimous holding
of all courts that insurance contracts must be liberally construed in favor of a policyholder or beneficiary thereof, whenever possible, and strictly
construed against the insurer in order to afford
the protection which the insured was endeavoring
to secure when he applied for insurance. s The
"12 Insurance Law & Practice 240, §7171 (Axtell v American Livestock Ins. Co. 1923, 194 N.W. 652, 46 SD 498).
'ID 13 at page 50, §7401 (Richards v Standard Accident Ins. Co.,
1921, 200 P 1017, 58 Utah 622, 17 ALR 1183; Colovos v Home
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 1934, 28 Pac. 2d 607, 83 Utah 401; Gibson v Equitable Life Assur. Soc of U.S. 1934, 36 P 2d 105, 84
Utah 452; Browning v Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. 1937,
72 P 2d 1060, 94 Utah 532, rehearing denied, 80 P 2d 348, 94
Utah 570).
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courts have felt that the language of insurance
policies is selected by one of the parties alone, and
the language employed by the parties should be
construed against it.' Thus if the meaning of the
words employed is doubtful or uncertain, or if any
reason or ambiguity exists either in the policy as a
whole or in portions thereof, the insured should
have the benefit of a favorable construction in
such instance."
"The Courts have frequently stated that the
provisions limiting liability of the insurer-such
as exceptions from coverage, exclusions, restrictions, and conditions-are particularly deserving
of strict construction so as not to cut down the
coverage which the insured believed he was purchasing. This rule applies also to those matters
which are purely procedural in their nature, so
as to make available the rights which have accrued
to the insured under the policy. And the Courts
are inclined to give a liberal construction to warranties, particularly in holding them to be mere
representations, unless the intention of the parties
is so clear that the court has no alternative but to
enforce them as written."
The pocket part of the cited section goes on to say
4

Ibid-footnote states: "There is another principle applying to

contracts of insurance to the effect that if they are drawn as
to require interpretation and fairly susceptible on t:vo different versions the one will be adopted most favorable to the
insured; and will be liberally construed in favor of the object
to be accomplished and the conditions and provisions therein
will be strictly construed against the insurer, as they are issued
upon printed fom15 prepared by experts at the instance of the
insurer, and the preparation of which the insured has no
voice." (Guarantee Trust Co. v Continental Life Ins. Co.
1930, 294 P 585, at page 587, 159 Wash. 683).
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"* * * the insurer has the burden of sustaining a
construction in its favor where the policy is susceptible of a construction in favor of the insured." 5
"An insurance contract must be construed
most favorably to the insured regardless of the
amount of premium paid by the insured. Where
a doubt arises as to the effective date of a policy,
a provision must be construed, if possible, in favor
of the insured." 6
Concerning the question as to whether the deceased
was injured, sick, or disabled, American Jurisprudence in
discussing such terms as disability, immediate and continuous disability and other terms, states that irrespective
of the technical variations in the language employed, the
term "total disability" should be given a rational and
practical construction. It is a rule of Jurisprudence indicating a policy of the law to give a rational and practical
construction and it is appellant's contention that the only
rational construction of the language in the insurance
booklet would be that the waiver contained in the insurance booklet would include the facts in this case and that
to rule otherwise would create a forfeiture and failure of
consideration as further discussed in this brief. 1
13 Insurance Law & Practice 106, §7405. (American Fid. and
Cas. Co. v Williams, Tex Cixil Ap 1931, 34 SW 2d 397, 402,
which says: "The general rule is that a contract of insurance
will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured, and this rule applies to all provisions
relating to a forfeiture of the rights of the insured and to any
language in the policy regarding exceptions, warranties, and
conditions, and if said language is not clear, it is ambiguous
and uncertain, any doubt as to the meaning thereof will be
resolved against the insurer.").
"Ibid at 133, §7424.
7
44 Am Jur 2d 496, §1606.
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It is the contention of the Plaintiff and Appellant
that the wording contained in the second paragraph on
page 5 of the insurance booklet should be interpreted, at
most, to set the date when the benefits can be collected
because under ordinary circumstances p'.lyment \vould be
due when the event insured against happened, or proof
of it happening was submitted, unless there is a time
specified in the policy; furthermore this provision would
also apply to the time when benefits for regular disability
would start to accrue.'
The case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
vs. Evans is also of interest in connection with interpretation of insurance policies, and especially group insurance policies. 9 This case involved a group insurance policy which provided for payment for permanent and total
disability provided the disability commenced one year
after the insurance became effective. In this case the policy was issued July 7, 1931, and the injury occurred November 6, 1931, less than six months after its issuance.
The jury was charged that if total and permanent disability did not occur until after the insurance had been
in effect one year they could find for evidence and the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the charge was not
in error even though the accident causing the disability
had happened prior to the expiration of the year since
total disability was a question of fact and may not have
commenced until the policy had in fact been in effect for
one year.
Before leaving the matter of ambiguity and interpre8
9

See 46 CJS 135, §1197.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Evans, Ga 1936, 189 SE 369; rehearing denied December, 1936.
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tation, perhaps it would he well to consider the case of
Vviernecke v Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Company.1°
This c , held that as to certain insurance transactions,
cu" crnge obtDined is that which the ordinary layman,
acting in ordinary course of business, would reasonably
expect by virtue of the transaction, and insurance supported by his contract will be determined accordingly
unle::;s it is made clear to him that the coverage provided
by tbc Contract does not conform to what an ordinary
lc1.yman might reasonably expect under the circumstances.
The subject case arose out of an application which was
made for insurance subject to revocation by the Company
within a certain period upon finding the person to be
uninsurable and the application was received July 17,
1962, and the insured died August 3, 1962. In deciding
the case the Court said, "To the ordinary layman, payment of an insurance premium constitutes payment for
insurance protection." Admittedly this case is not directly
in point but appellant believes that it is persuasive since
it appears that there are no cases squarely in point on
the issues being presented to the honorable Court.
III. THAT THE DECEASED HAD PERFORMED
ALL OF THE ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTED THE
CONS ID ERATION FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND TI-IAT THE STATED EFFECTIVE DATE
or THE POLICY w i\S A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT FORMING NO PART OF THE CONSIDERATION AND THEREFORE PERFORMANCE OF THE
SAME SHOULD BE EXCUSED AND TO RULE
OTHERWISE WOULD RESULT IN A FORFEITURE.
The deceased, Russell L. Marriot, had, by working
10

Wernecke v Pacific Fid. Life Ins. Co., Cal. December 20, 1965,
48 Cal. Rptr. 251.
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the number of hours required, given full consideration
for insurance coverage and apparently there would be
no question that had he been injured and survived, in
any State whether conscious or unconscious, until November 1, 1964, his estate would have been entitled to the
full amount of the insurance coverage as set forth in the
insurance booklet.

In connection with this we should look at Restatement of Contracts which states,

"Excuse of Condition That Involves Forfeiture. A
condition may be excused without other reason if
its requirement (a) would involve extreme forfeiture or penalty, and ( b) its existence or occurrence
forms no essential part of the exchange for the
promisor's performance. " 11

Continuing on the same question, Williston on Contracts states as follows:
"Impossibility that would discharge the duty to
perform a promise excuses a condition if (a) the
debt for performance rendered has already arisen
and the condition relates only to the time when
the debt is to be discharged, or (b) existence or
occurrence of the condition is no material part of
the exchange or the promisor's performance and
the discharge of the promisor will operate as a
forfeiture.
"Both the general rule and the exceptions
find frequent application in the law of insurance."12
The section cited goes on to explain that failure to comply with the conditions of a policy which forms a mate11
12

Restatement of Contracts, §302.
5 Will. 870, §808.

10

rial part of the return performance, such as payment of
or changing the risk would preclude enforce;11ent •. ut in the case at hand the premiums have been
paid throuf!;h working required hours and since there is
no change of risk it appears that under both the Restatement and Williston the appellant is entitled to return
performance and consideration from the respondents.
In this same line of thought, in the case of Kentucky
I Iome Mutual Life Insurance Company v Marshall the
Court said,
"We think that Marshall (the insured) did everything that it was possible for him to do. He paid
his initiation fee, dues, and advance premiums,
and made out his application for insurance which
was sent to the company and approved by it. ... " 13
To rule against the Plaintiff and Appellant in this
case would result in a forfeiture since it is not contested
that the premiums were paid into the Fund by the employer, pursuant to contracts with the union. The premiums so paid were a part of the earnings of the deceased
and to rule in favor of the Defendants would be a forfeiture of the premiums where all of the conditions had
been met, except for the alleged waiting time for vesting
of the rights to the insurance. It has been a unanimous
and long standing policy of the Courts to avoid forfeitures. In this connection Williston on Contracts states,
in part,
'From an early date, forfeitures have been sternly
contemplated and frowned upon by the Courts;
and the cases generally hold that forfeiture pro1:1

Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Marshall, Ken. 1942, 163
SW 2d 45, 291 Ky 120.
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visions are strictly construed. Thus, in o. suit for
construction of a deed upon a condition subsequent involving a forfeiture, the Court said: 'forfeitures are not favored by our laws .... the courts
will not declare a forfeiture, unless they are compelled to do so, by language which will not admit
of but one construction and that construction is
such as compels forfeiture.
'Forfeiture clauses fail in the event they are
ambiguously expressed .... If the provision is ambiguous, that alone condemns it as a forfeiture
provision. A forfeiture should rest on surer ground .
. . . The authority to forfeit a vested right or estate
should not rest in provisions whose meaning is
uncertain or obscure. It should be found only in
language which is plain and clear, whose unequivocal character may render its exercise fair and
rightful.' "u
The foregoing language is clear, but if there should
be any question concerning the problem of sickness, injury, disability and death, as we have in the present case,
Williston goes on to explain that the one writing the contract can by exactness in his expression prevent any mistakes in: meaning and that a person writing the contract
is in a position to prevent these doubts while the person
who accepts it does not in reality have this same opportunity; and concludes that any ambiguity of language
should be resolved in favor of the person who accepts the
writing of another, which in this case would be resolving
in favor of the appellant. 10
IV. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICIES AND INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW THE
RESPONDENT TO KEEP THE CONSIDERATION
14
15

4 Will. 333, §602a.
Ibid 760, §621.
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GIVEN AND AT THE SAME TIME TO AVOID ALL
LIABILITY UNDER THE INSURANCE COVERAGE.
To ··ule in favor of the Defendants and Respondents
,., ,1u1J, in cffrct, allow them to accept premiums and then
\ oicl the insvrance under the terms of coverage which
they had written, even where there had been full compliance with all of the provisions but where the insured,
under unusual circumstances had done everything other
tlrnn continuing to live, even if in a coma, until a certain
date had passed; and would result in an inequitable situation which is not favored in the law as shown above.
Also, we would run into a rather peculiar defect in
the law wherein if the insured had been fired and been
entitled to conversion privileges, the life insurance policy
would have been held valid under the laws of Utah .. 1 "
This provides that if a person shall die who is covered by a
group life insurance policy, such policy must contain a
provision that he continues to be insured during the period within which he would have been entitled to have
an individual policy issued to him. It also provides that
the amount of the life insurance to which he would have
been entitled shall be p8yablc as a claim under the group
policy, \\·hether or not application for the individual policy or payment of the first premium has been made. 11
Under the circumstances just cited, where a person
has the privilege of converting insurance after employment terminates and before he is able to actually complete tlie conversion he is entitled to coverage. Under
these circumstances to find against the appellant and
plaintiff would make it impossible for a person who was
1

"

17

31-23-17 Utah Codes Annotated, 1953.
Ibid 31-23-15 and 16, Utah Codes Annotated, 1953.
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or

on the job, and killed on the job to nrnid forfeiture
all
his rights. It is the clear intention of these sections to
avoid forfeiture of insurance and allmv for conversiun of
equity in the insur:mce to prevent a \\inclfall to insurnncc
companies and recognizes a public policy of pre\·cntin;
forfci tures and windfalls.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and Appellant believes that the evidence
thus far introduced, ;1.s a m;!tter of la\\', should be resolved
in favor of the Plaintiff and Judgment entered nccordingly. There was a waiver contained within the insurance
booklet, the master policy never having yet been entered
into evidence, which contains a waiver sufficient to find
for the Plaintiff, and if there are any ambiguities therein
we believe that the law clearly states that the ambiguities
should be resolved in favor of the Appellant since the
consideration for the insurance coverage had in fact been
fully performed and to hold otherwise would result in a
forfeiture which is not favored by the Courts and furthermore that such a forfeiture \\'ould be contrary to public
policy.
In view of the Court granting a Summary Judgment
and not entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and there being no record of the arguments and
stipulations, by reason of practice of the Court, and as an
alternative to finding for the appellant we feel that the
matter should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings and trial of the matter on its merits with
the usual prerogative of either party to request a trial by
jury if they should so desire.
Respectfully submitted,
ARDEN E. COOMBS

Attorney for Appellant
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